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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
l'TAll STATI~~ BUlLDTl':G BOARD, 
Plain.tiffs, 
- vs-
(H:OH<H~ H. ROl\fNEY and M. WAL-
LIN BO~I XI 1:Y, d-h-a G. MAURICE 
no~~~ l':y C01\1P ANY, a partnership, 
Pt nl. 
[)l'jendants, Third-Pa-rty Plaintiffs, 
and Appellants, 
- vs-
f~Dr~TBL\L INDEMNITY COM-
P.\XY, a corporation, 
J'hird-Parfy DefPHdant and Respondent. 
Case 
No.10128 
APPELLANTS' REP·L Y BRIEF 
ARGU~1:ENT 
POINT I. 
THE PRETRIAL ORDER WAS NOT A FINAL JUDG-
:\[ENT FRO:JI WHICH AN APPEAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
TAKEN. 
This Court has previously denied Respondent's 
~[otion to Dismiss the .appeal. However, since Respond-
t 'n t has again brought this question into focus under 
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its Point IV in Respondent's brief, Appellants must 
reply to Respondent's argun1ents. 
A. THE PRE-·T·RIAL ORDER WAS INTER-
LOCUTORY IN FQR.M AND SUBSTANCE. 
1. The Court reserved the right to change the Pre-
Trial Order. 
A Pre-Trial is by its very nature and form a pre-
liminary order defining the issues to be tried at the 
subsequent trial. It is susceptible of modification after 
the Pre-·T'rial hearing, thereby reserving to the Court 
the power and jurisdiction to change it. The Pre-Trial 
Judge in this case expressly made this reservation in 
Paragraph 17 thereof: (R. 228) 
"It is ordered that no further amendments 
be permitted to the pleadings or to this order 
except for good cause shown and to prevent mani-
fest injustice." (Italics added) 
In the case of David v. Goodman, (Calif.) 200 Pac. 2d 
568, and again in Hunter v. Merger Mines Corporation, 
(Idaho) ( 1945) 160 Pac. 2d 455, the Courts held that in 
cases of such reservations, the order of the Court was 
not final and an appeal would not lie therefrom. 
In Maybury v. City of Seattle (Wash.) 336 Pac. 2d 
878, the Court held that a Pre-Trial Order limiting the 
issues to be tried was not a final appealable order. See 
also Green v. Green, (Tex.) (1952) 247 S.W. 2d 583, and 
Meehen v. Hopps, (Calif.) <19·55) 288 Pac. 2d 267. 
Certainly, in view of the prevailing practice relating 
to Pre-T'rial Orders, in view of the specific wording of 
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t h~> Onlt•r it::;.-ll', and undt•r t lu· a hove cas(':-', appellants 
\\'<'!'~' rig-htfully entitled to n•ly upon the Pre-Trial Order 
l):•ing intPrloeutnry in nature. 
~ . . In urrlf'r for dismissal is not a fina.l judgment. 
In Parag-raph 17 of the Pre-Trial Order, (R. 228) 
tht> ( ~ourt said: 
"It is ordered that the action insofar as the 
lndnstrial lndeinnity ,Company, a corporation, is 
e<·tw<'rnPd. lw dismissed with prejudice." 
ThiH statPnwnt is not a final judg1nent from which an 
app<'al will li<'. Tn the case of Attorney General of Uta.h 
v. Pomeroy, et al, 93 Utah 426, 452, this Court in setting 
t'nrth the gen(•ral rules relating to the finality of various 
ordf:lrH, Htat<'d that no appeal would lie when an " ... 
ordl'l' for but no judgment of dismissal is entered. Lukich 
r. Utah Construction Company, 46 Utah 317." 
In Lukicll, supra, after the plaintiff's case had been 
CCll!tpldPd, defendant made a motion for a non-suit, 
which motion was granted. In the transcript of the record 
:l}ljH'HI'S this: 
"In this case, the Court sustains the motion 
for a non-suit and judgment for non-suit may be 
granted." 
There "·as attached to the transcript a document entitled, 
"EntPred Order," which stated in part: 
"The ·Court having considered the defendant's 
motion for judgment of noli-suit and dismissal 
herein, and being fully advised in the premises, 
it is ordered that the said motion be, and it is, 
hereby sustained." 
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In holding that such an order was not a final judg-
ment, the Court said: 
"The recitals at most but show an order 
granting a non-suit, or directing a judgment of 
non-suit. It does not show a judgment, one in 
fact rendered or entered. From what is recited, 
it may be said the case was sent out of court. 
But that a judgment was in fact rendered or 
entered is left to argument and discussion. If a 
judgment was rendered and entered, it ought to 
appear by the court's record and the Judgment 
Book . . . That has not been done. Until so done, 
we cannot possibly know that a judgment has 
been rendered or entered." 
It is thus clear that the judgment finally entered 
pursuant to said Order was not properly filed and enter-
ed until April 2, 1964, (R. 233-235) and thus the appeal 
was timely made. 
3. The Pre-Trial Order did not comply with Rule 
54 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 54 (b) provides, as follows : 
''(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Clauns. When 
more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-
claim, or third-party claim, a final judgment may 
be entered upon one or more but less than all of 
the claims only upon an express determination by 
the court that there is no just reason for delay 
and upon an express direction for the entry of 
judgment. In the absence of such determination 
and direction, any order or other form of decision, 
however designated, which adjudicates less than 
all the claims shall not terminate the action as to 
any of the claims, and the order or other form 
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of d1·<·i:..;ion i~ ~uhjt>d to revision at any tim<' be-
l'on• t hl' entry of jndgtll<·nt adjudicatiHg all tht• 
dui m~." 
l.n th·· Pn•-'Crial Onh•r, thl•re :..;pt>eifically is no deter-
minatiPn tltnt "th<'rt' is no just n•ason for delay." Thus 
by tlw v<·ry provi~ion~ of said rule, the Order cannot 
be final. lind tlwn' been smne reference to the rule, or 
had tiH•rp lwPn <·ompliancP with its provisions, then as-
suming t!w ( )rder is one capable of becoming final, it 
it l'ai r to assmm• the appellants would have been placed 
on noticP a~ to its claimed finality. Since there was no 
~neh rPI'en•JH'P or c01npliance with the rule, the Order 
i~ not t'i nal. 
I\ ult• 54 <b) is identical to Rule 54 (b) of the Federal 
Hui<'S of Ci \'i l Procedure. In 6 .lvl oore' s Federal Practice, 
pag't's :20-t-:21 :2, there is an extensive discussion of the 
purpo::H's of this rule, which discussion can best be sum-
marizPd by the . :\dyisory Committee's notes, a portion 
nt' ,,·hieh rt>:.Hl:_.;:, as follows: 
"The mnended rule is designated to make 
clt•m· that interim adjudications disposing of 
sonw. but not all, of the claims, counterclaims, 
cro~~-claims and third-party claims arising out of 
a ~ingle transaction or occurrence are generally 
pn)\'i:sional. Judgment is not to be entered until 
a 11 of such claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and 
third-party claims are determined, unless the 
court expressly determines that there is no just 
reason for delaying judgment as to the claims 
adjudicated and expressly enters a final judg-
ment thereon. Thus the rights of the parties are 
protected and, except in the case where a specific 
final judgment is entered as to some but not all 
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claims as aforesaid, one appeal will suffice to 
present all of the rulings to the appellate court." 
Again, on page 207, Moore states in citing Dav,id v. 
District of Columbia, (CA D.C.) (1950) 187 Fed. 2d 
204, 206: 
"The District Court is not obliged to enter 
a final judgment until it has completely adjudi-
cated the multiple claims action. The rule merely 
prescribes that, when the District Court has ad-
judicated at least one clairn but less than all of 
the claims, the Court 'if it does choose to enter 
such a final order, must do so in a definite, un-
mistakable manner.'" 
Rule 54 (b) does not, however, enlarge appellate 
jurisdiction by making appealable judgments or orders 
·w·hich otherwise would not be. Flegenheimer v. General 
Mills Company, 191 Fed. 2d 237 (~CA 2d, 1951). 
Therefore, the Court has a definite obligation to 
specifically define a judgment in a multiple claims case 
as a final judgment. Failing this, the judgment or order 
is not final and matters included therein n1ay be raised 
on appeal after disposition of the entire case. 
B. IN SUBSTANCE THE ORDER IS NOT 
FINAL. 
Assuming arguendo that the Pre-Trial Order was 
final in fonn and did comply with Rule 54 (b), it would 
still fail as a final judgment. The Third-Party Com-
plaint (R .. 8) and the Pre-Trial Order (R. 228) show 
that respondent Bonding Company was charged with 
liability for any bills which the appellant was required 
to pay to the plaintiffs under the Utah Bonding Statute, 
6 
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SPdion t-l-1-1, L"tah CodP Annotated, 1953, as anwnded. 
rrhe hond und~·r whieh appellants claimed over against 
n-spondtmt (Pn•-Trial Exhibit 1) shows appellants as 
,,jdi~~'"~ and tlw various plaintiffs and ereditors as ben-
el'i<·iarit·s. 
Tht> liability of the respondent to the appellants 
wm~ contingent upon the Court's determining the extent 
of appl'ilants' liability to the various plaintiffs or cred-
itors. '1\> the Pxtent that appellants had to pay any of 
:-;aid daims, tiH·n appellants were seeking recovery over 
against respondent for that mnount on the bond. The 
final liability of respondent to appellants could not, 
tlwn•forl', be determined until a trial was had at which 
tlw validity and amount of the creditors' claims were 
determined. Obviously, if the creditors did not establish 
their claims under the Bonding Statute against appel-
lants, then appellants would have no claim over on the 
hond against r(lspondent. In this event, appella~ts would 
han• no objection to respondent being dismissed out of 
the law ~nit. If appellants did have a claim over, then, 
nf eonrst>, they would object to the dismissal of respond-
t•nt. 
'rhis Court, in the Pomeroy, supra, case, discusses 
at great lPngth the finality of judgments in cases involv-
ing multiple claims such as this case at bar. The discus-
~ion in the Pomeroy case involves various parties and 
daims rather than cases cases involving merely a plain-
tiff and a defendant. The general rule followed in the 
Utah eases prior to the Pomeroy case as enunciated in 
:::nrh case as Oldroyd r. McCrea, 65 Utah 142, 235 Pac. 
;)~ll. and Xorth Point Consolidated Irrigation Company 
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v. Utah and Salt Lake Canal Cornpany, 14 Utah 155, 46 
Pac. 824, 826, is to the effect that the judgment must 
dispose of all parties and all clalins in the case and must 
finally dispose of the subject matter. 
In Porneroy supra., the Court lays down the follow-
ing rules in detern1ining the finality of a judgment for 
purposes of appeal: 
"We do not pretend to lay down a completely 
comprehensive definition or test of what consti-
tutes such a severable interest in a suit as to 
make such judgment of dismissal final as to the 
plaintiff and such defendant for purposes of ap-
peal. But it seems that in order to be severable, 
and therefore appealable, any determination of 
the issues so settled by the judgment of dismissal 
must not affect the determination of the remain-
ing issues whether such judgment on appeal is 
reversed or affirmed, nor may the determination 
of the issues remaining affect the final determina-
tion of the issues between plaintiff and the dis-
missed defendant. If the determination of the 
issues relating to the dismissed defendant will or 
may affect the determination of the remaining 
issues, the judgment of dismissal is not appeal-
able. Perhaps another way of saying it would be 
that the judgment is severable when the original 
determination of those issues by the trial court 
and reflected in the judgment or any determina-
tion which could be as the result of an appeal 
cannot affect the determination of the remaining 
issues of the suite, nor can the determination of 
such remaining issues affect the issues between 
plaintiff and the dismissed defendants if such 
defendants are restored to the case by a reversal. 
" . . . If the claimed basis of liability of the 
dismissed defendants is connected with or so 
related to the claimed basis of liability of the 
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rPm a in in,!!; dPI't·ndants ~o that olH' Inay a fft•d the 
ot ht>r, a .indgmPn t a~ to t ht- discharged defendants 
i:-; not nppP<dahlP until thP issues as to the rPmain-
in.!!; defendants an• settled." 
It i~ e!Par in our easP that thP rights and liabilities 
rl'~JH'divPly of the appellants and respondent are so 
interrelah•d that a final disposition in the trial of the 
t'rt>ditors' claims was necessary before any judgment 
could IH' made falling under the Pomeroy rule. 
SU~LMARY 
Xt•ithPr in forn1 nor in substance does the Pre-Trial 
( )rdt•r a~snnH' a status of a final judgment. Appellants 
han• PYPry rig-ht to rely upon the interlocutory nature 
of tlw wording of the Order. Appellants are just as 
t·ntitll'd to rt>ly upon the provisions of Rule 5-± (b) in its 
dt•finition of the manner in which a final judgment must 
btl f:'nh•rt>d in cases of multiple claims . 
. \ppellants havp a just cause in holding respondent 
to its bonding liability and should not be denied the 
JH'OJWr appellate review of the issues raised by the trial 
l'nnrt's dismissal of respondent. Appellants respectfully 
snhmit that the appeal should not be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
lT.YDE, ~IECHA~I & PRATT 
By 
Elliott Lee Pratt 
Attorneys for Appellants 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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